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Governing Global Slums: 
The Biopolitics of Target 11
c
Tim Di Muzio
Recent literature has focused on the ways in which civil society organiza-
tions are contributing to practices of global governance in an era of neo-
liberalism. As UN Habitat has pointed out, what has also coincided with the
shift to neoliberalism is the proliferation and growth of global slums. As
slums have become an increasingly widespread form of human settlement,
a global campaign to improve the life of slum dwellers has emerged under
the Millennium Development Goals. In this article, I argue that this project
can be conceived of as a biopolitical campaign where nongovernmental and
community-based organizations are viewed as a kind of panacea for the
problem of slums. This view is misguided given the scale of the problem
and the apartheid of life chances that has accompanied neoliberalism. KEY-
WORDS: Governance, neoliberalism, slums, nongovernmental organizations,
community-based organizations, biopolitics.
Recent literature has focused on the ways in which private authoritiesin the “third sector” are both reshaping and contributing to practicesof global liberal governance and development.1 In part, this growing
research agenda can be attributed to the massive growth and proliferation of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organiza-
tions (CBOs) during the last decades of the twentieth century, the diversity
of their concerns, and the willingness of other actors to view them as legit-
imate forms of authority. Although there is debate over the exact reasons for
the growth of these organizations, there seems to be a general consensus that
their importance in the governance process has coincided with the world-
wide neoliberal revolution in economic policy and the privileging of poly-
archical forms of democracy.2 As UN Habitat has pointed out, what has also
coincided with the shift to neoliberalism and democracy promotion is the
proliferation and growth of global slums.3
As slums have become an increasingly widespread form of human set-
tlement, a complex nexus of multilevel governance initiatives has devel-
oped to combat the dismal life conditions manifest in slums.4 The agents
involved in slum interventions range from supranational institutions such as
UN Habitat and the World Bank to local governments, NGOs, and CBOs.5
Although any study concerning the governance of slums should take care to
realize that interventions are often multifaceted, the current governance
agenda appears to coalesce around Goal 7, Target 11 of the Millennium
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Development Goals—“the world’s targets for dramatically reducing ex-
treme poverty in its many dimensions by 2015.”6 Under Goal 7, which
emphasizes environmental sustainability, Target 11 directs supranational
institutions, national and local governments, and civil society organizations
to “achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million
slum dwellers, by 2020.”7 Initially, this may sound like a sufficiently ambi-
tious goal until one realizes that about 1 billion people on the planet cur-
rently live in informal settlements where the healthy, productive, and sus-
tainable reproduction of social life is under constant threat. The modesty
of this goal is further compounded by the fact that the planet’s slum inhab-
itants are projected to swell to well beyond 1 billion if current patterns of
uneven development and income inequality persist.
While this goal may appear to some to be a miserly attempt to combat
the problem of global slums, I argue in this article that it is more important
to understand the governance of global slums as an increasingly important
dimension of the Western biopolitical project to enhance and optimize the
life chances of the “global poor.” Within this project, slum dwellers are
considered a particular subset of the global poor, primarily distinguished by
their forms of shelter, the deprivations they experience, and their exclusion
from the formal economy. However, although slum residents represent an
increasingly important target population for the agents of global liberal
governance and their biopolitical imperatives to improve life, their strategic
interventions are likely to fail in an age where neoliberal dogma continues
to dominate the policy agenda of governments and supranational institu-
tions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
the World Trade Organization (WTO). This argument resonates with those
of other critical scholars who have detailed and explored the rapid deterio-
ration of living conditions and human security in an age of “disciplinary
neoliberalism” and one where new constitutional and quasi-constitutional
measures are used to lock-in policy commitments to neoliberalism.8
The chief contribution of this article is to continue this exploration in
light of the growth and proliferation of global slums and to offer a critique
of the biopolitical project that has developed as a response. One of the pri-
mary responses to improving the lives of slum dwellers has centered on the
activity of NGOs and the self-help initiatives of CBOs. For many, these
organizations hold the key to a more democratized and participatory form
of development and are viewed as vital agents in the global campaign to
upgrade slums and arrest their future formation.
However, while we can recognize some of the important contributions
NGOs and CBOs are making to reach the Millennium target of improving
life in the slums, I argue here that their interventions cannot be viewed as a
panacea for what appears to be a mounting problem in need of broader and
longer-term solutions that require a radical turn away from neoliberalism. In
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considering this hypothesis, I first provide an overview of the growth and
proliferation of slums, noting how these unplanned and insecure spaces are
global in nature. As such, the politics of life and death in slums represents
one of the key governance challenges of the twenty-first century. In the sec-
ond section, I build on the work of Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose to con-
sider how strategic interventions in global slums have become a biopoliti-
cal imperative for agents of global liberal governance.9 In this campaign to
improve the lives of slum dwellers, NGOs and CBOs are given a central
role. However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that this campaign
will ultimately fail. In the final sections, I explore some of the practical and
theoretical reasons for this failure.
Neoliberal Camps for a Surplus Humanity
The political theorist Giorgio Agamben has argued that the (concentration)
camp is the true “biopolitical paradigm of the modern,” but slums, with
their growth and proliferation, may soon take over this role.10 At the very
minimum, slums may come to be seen as the twenty-first century version of
the concentration camp—a warehouse, in the words of Mike Davis, for a
surplus humanity.11 For Agamben, camps are constructed spaces outside for-
mal legal protections where anything becomes possible and life is ultimately
exposed to death and the machinations of a sovereign power in excess.
Camps are the spaces that open up when formal legal rights and protections
are suspended and the state of exception as defined by the sovereign starts to
become the rule. Although the ongoing generation of urban slums may not
be due to the sovereign suspension of the liberal rule of law as in a state of
emergency, these seemingly exceptional, or what some consider transitional,
spaces of capitalist modernity are fast becoming what UN Habitat has called
“the norm rather than the exception in the poorest cities of the world.”12
Thus, the “true” biopolitical paradigm of modernity should be sought not
only in the detention and refugee camps of the twenty-first century, but also
in those proliferating spaces where life is increasingly concentrated and its
vitality increasingly threatened on a daily basis: global slums.13
As a form of human settlement, slums have been historically linked
with the rise of agrarian capitalism and a competitive market in land, a
process that began, according to Karl Marx, in thirteenth-century England.14
During successive waves of enclosure and the gradual mechanization of
farming, traditional forms of tenure were overturned as landlords and capi-
talist tenant farmers started to respond to price signals in the world market.
As a consequence, rural subsistence producers began to be expropriated
from the land they once worked for their own survival. This created both a
nomadic population whose survival strategies were increasingly criminal-
ized and one that would have little choice but to eventually flee into the
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cities in search of paid work. Marx called this slow yet violent process
“primitive accumulation,” by which he meant the series of strategies and
tactics employed by landowners, agrarian capitalists, and parliament to
expropriate and dispossess people of their traditional access to the means of
survival. It is perhaps no surprise then that we find the first slums in the
birthplace of capitalism, where cities and the nascent manufacturing indus-
try were unable to absorb the massive influx of the dispossessed rural pop-
ulation.15 Indeed, by 1900, Britain was the most urbanized country in the
world, with 80 percent of its population living in cities—the majority in
deplorable conditions; this population became the subject of exhaustive sur-
veys such as Charles Booth’s studies of life and labor in Victorian London.
While famine, civil wars, counterinsurgencies, population growth, and
debt have contributed to the growth and formation of slums, the trend in
rural-to-urban migration and the growth of the world’s urban population has
intensified in our own era of neoliberal globalization where creditors and
investors are privileged over other social forces and groups. Indeed, as UN
Habitat has remarked in its 2003 flagship report on human settlements, the
growth and proliferation of slums has coincided with the near-ubiquitous
adoption of a set of neoliberal policy prescriptions—an indictment reiter-
ated in its 2006/07 report on the world’s cities. Such policies have not only
redefined political possibilities for the majority of humanity, but have also
intensified the mass human flight into urban environments that cannot pro-
vide adequate shelter or infrastructural support for the healthy reproduction
of social life. Since there is a direct correlation between neoliberal policies
and the rapid (and projected) growth of slums, these neighborhoods could
well be called neoliberal camps for a surplus humanity. The magnitude of
the global slum problem is truly staggering and represents one of the key
governance challenges facing the future of humanity.
As the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects noted in 2003, by 2007 over
50 percent of the human inhabitants on the planet will live in urban environ-
ments, a figure that is expected to increase to 61 percent by 2030. This is a
historical tipping point, since for all of human history, the rural population
has far outweighed the urban. What this means is that by 2030, about 5 bil-
lion people will be urban dwellers. According to UN projections, much of
this growth will be absorbed by cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants in
the Global South.16 Moreover, the UN estimates that in 2007, one third of the
globe’s urban population (or 1 billion people) resided in unplanned, informal,
and insecure settlements. If nothing is done to slow down this great transfor-
mation in the geography of social life, the UN expects that those living in the
world’s slums will jump to 1.4 to 2 billion by 2020.17 Overall, the UN Global
Urban Observatory has estimated that there are about 200,000 slums around
the world, and although they are geographically concentrated in the Global
South, about 6 percent of the globe’s slum population can be found in
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advanced capitalist economies, in cities such as Los Angeles and Barce-
lona.18 Thus, advanced capitalist economies are not immune to this form of
informal shelter.
What this statistical overview reveals is that slums may be the “emerg-
ing human settlements of the 21st century.”19 Such a disastrous prospect
has not been lost on a range of national and international actors that are cur-
rently involved in a biopolitical project to govern the improvement of life
chances in slums. This biopolitical project is embedded in an emerging
regime of global liberal governance whose main strategic concern “is to
establish functioning market economies and plural polities in the border-
lands” of the global economy.20 With this insight in mind, the following
section aims to provide a sketch of how slums are an increasingly important
dimension of this emerging regime of global liberal governance, with a view
to questioning how the biopolitical imperative to improve the vital chances
of slum dwellers may be in contradiction with the reliance on NGOs and
CBOs and the political economy of disciplinary neoliberalism.
The Biopolitical Imperatives of Governing Global Slums
In his historical researches on power and knowledge, Foucault introduced
the concept of biopolitics to underscore the ways in which the biological
life of human beings became an object of political knowledge and inter-
vention. He argued that this new form of power had its conditions of emer-
gence in seventeenth-century Europe and distinguished it from a form of
power centered on the right of the sovereign to “take life or let live.”21
Rather than a power centered on the right to command death, the aim of this
new technology of power was to administer life in such a way as to enhance,
optimize, improve, and invest in its chances. Unlike Foucault’s earlier con-
cept of disciplinary power that functions at the level of the individual body
to render it compliant, biopower targets the population as its field of inter-
vention. According to Foucault, biopower’s emergence was coeval with the
rise of the statistical sciences and social surveys that revealed the social con-
ditions and general regularities among national populations. For example,
governors and statisticians became conscious of such things as birth and
death rates and how the natural and human-made environment affected the
vital aspects of social life.
For Foucault, the rise of biopower was also intertwined with the govern-
mental concern to increase “the wealth of nations,” since illnesses and the
poor administration of life could threaten a nation’s success in the struggle
to compete with other political communities in the race for land, power, and
resources. What we find since the seventeenth century, then, is a new form of
power whose correlate is not the punishment, discipline, and death of the
individual body, but the population in all its multiplicity and regularity—a
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power that will seek to enhance, defend, and invest in the life of a popula-
tion and its chances of survival. Today, the literature on biopolitics ranges
from debates on the meaning of life and death, the ethics of euthanasia, the
capitalization of biotech firms, and new technologies for reproducing and
manipulating life, to the meaning of the “molecular revolution” in biology,
the application of the life sciences to the technologies of warfare, the
detainment of internally displaced persons and refugees, and the use of bio-
metric technologies in apparatuses of security and surveillance. In this arti-
cle, however, I want to draw attention to how we can conceive of interven-
tions in slums as part of a biopolitical project associated with global liberal
governance and its aim to promote open market economies and attendant
forms of polyarchical democracy.
Working with the concept of biopolitics, Rabinow and Rose have sug-
gested that biopower designates a “plane of actuality” whose study must
include at least three elements. First, “one or more truth discourses about
the ‘vital’ character of human life” should be identified, along with the
“authorities that are considered competent to speak that truth.” Second, a
concern for biopower will identify the “strategies for intervention” that are
meant to increase the life chances and health of a given population. Third,
biopower implies certain “modes of subjectification through which individ-
uals are brought to work on themselves . . . in the name of their own life
or health.”22
With these criteria in mind, I want to suggest here that improving and
administering life in slums has now become a global biopolitical imperative.
This is not to suggest that the slum is a wholly new target for political inter-
vention. Indeed, schemes to deal with slum dwellers and their environment
can be traced back to the nineteenth century and range from slum clearances
to behavioral projects aimed at making the poor responsible for their own
sanitation and hygiene.23 However, what might be unique in our own con-
juncture is the global scale of the problem, the sense of urgency it is given
at the level of global governance, and the increasing reliance on NGOs and
the self-help initiatives of community-based organizations as a kind of pana-
cea for the problem of slums. Using Rabinow and Rose’s criteria, I offer in
the following subsections an overview of how the slum populations of the
globe have become a target of biopolitical governance and what strategies
have been mobilized to increase the chances of life in these proliferating
urban spaces.
Authoritative Truth Discourses
Historically, biopolitical interventions in slums were largely within the pur-
view of national and municipal governments with rapidly urbanizing popu-
lations. However, at least three moments in the twentieth and twenty-first
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centuries seem to have displaced the problematic of slums from a wholly
local and national issue to one of global biopolitical importance. First, the
creation of the United Nations offered the embryonic institutional architec-
ture to support global biopolitical initiatives by gathering data, coordinating
international initiatives, and suggesting best practices. Second, the rapid
growth of the planet’s human population since the 1950s and the shift toward
greater urbanization placed increasing emphasis on the need to study the im-
pacts of this process. Third, and overlapping with this realization, the more
methodical gathering of global statistics on the vital life of people in cities
revealed that slums were not an isolated form of human settlement confined
to a handful of countries, but a growing global phenomenon.
With these moments leading to a more global concern for slum forma-
tion, it becomes possible to identify three interrelated truth discourses that
inform the multilevel governance of global slums: (1) an official discourse
that seeks to define, locate, and map the target population of slum dwellers,
(2) a vital discourse about the conditions of life in slums, and (3) a wider
developmental discourse concerned with the initiatives that must be taken
to improve the vitality of slum dwellers within the context of a globalizing
economy, the increasing importance of cities, and the presence of NGOs
and CBOs. However, while these three sets of truth discourses inform the
biopolitical governance of slums, there is a fourth discourse that is less con-
cerned with improving slum life and more concerned with preparing for the
dangers the urban poor may pose to the security of the global economy. This
fourth discourse, which can also be said to inform the governance of global
slums is military-strategic in nature and is primarily articulated by the Pen-
tagon.24 In some senses this is also a biopolitical discourse since, although it
does not seek to ameliorate the life chances of slum dwellers, it is concerned
with protecting a specific population—those who currently benefit from cur-
rent patterns of production, trade, and finance.
Defining the Target
Slum dwellers are considered a particular, yet growing, subset of the global
poor and are distinguished by the authorities competent to speak about them
by the characteristics of their settlements. For instance, within the context of
growing urbanization, UN Habitat has argued that “the battle to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals will have to be waged in the world’s
slums,” since this is where the majority of the global poor will be found in
the not-too-distant future.25 Although UN Habitat admits that slums are not
homogenous entities and levels of deprivation vary from residency to resi-
dency, developing a knowledge base for intervention in global slums has
required an operational definition to better identify the target population.
Currently, UN Habitat defines slums along five measurable indicators: lack
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of water, lack of sanitation, overcrowding, nondurable housing structures,
and security of tenure. Individual households, UN Habitat’s basic unit of
analysis, need only demonstrate one of these conditions to qualify for inclu-
sion in the slum population. The first four indicators are intended to meas-
ure shelter deprivations and deficiencies, and the fifth indicator is concerned
with the legality of slum residents’ tenure over their diverse forms of shel-
ter and the land on which they are constructed.26
With the target population defined, UN Habitat has begun to develop a
“broad architecture for global monitoring and reporting,” a crucial step in
constructing the knowledge basis for reaching the biopolitical target of
improving the lives of at least 100 million slums dwellers by 2020.27 So far,
Habitat has been able to locate, map, and measure trends in the annual
growth rate of slums and the percentage of human inhabitants living in
slums by region of the world. For example, Habitat calculated that in 2005,
sub-Saharan Africa experienced the highest annual growth rate in slum for-
mation, with Oceania and Western Asia following close behind.28 Although
these statistics start to paint a picture of global slums—where they are
located, how quickly this form of human settlement is growing on a yearly
basis, and where—Habitat admits that more accurate and comprehensive
data collection needs to be carried out if the biopolitical project to help slum
dwellers is to be fulfilled.29
Vital Conditions
Davis has noted that the operational definition of slums does not include
the social dimensions of living in slums and thus may be a “very conserva-
tive gauge of what qualifies as a slum.”30 However, while social dimen-
sions are not captured in Habitat’s measurable indicators and many have
justified slums as an inevitable but transient phase en route to sustainable
urban development, there is increasing recognition that slums are neigh-
borhoods where the vital conditions necessary for the healthy and sustain-
able reproduction of life are lacking or completely absent. For example,
Habitat’s 2006/07 report noted that the “incidence of disease and mortality
is much higher in slums than non-slum urban areas.” The vital statistics of
life are further threatened by overcrowding and “inequality in access to serv-
ices.”31 For instance, the spatial concentration of bodies facilitates disease
transmission and may multiply the number of infections experienced by
slum residents, and the inability to access basic services may lead to “rising
violence, urban unrest, environmental degradation and underemployment,”32
As the UN task force charged with suggesting best practices for slum inter-
ventions argues, the threat to life’s vitality is self-reinforcing and begins
with informal shelter:
312 Governing Global Slums
Lack of access to adequate shelter deprives people of decent living con-
ditions. This deprivation, in turn, cripples the ability of the poor, particu-
larly women and children, to fight communicable disease; to properly con-
serve food supplies; to obtain proper medical treatment; to be protected
against danger, assaults, and injury; to access formal education and
employment—in sum, to access the opportunities (and safety nets) cities
offer their more fortunate citizens. In most cases, this creates a vicious
cycle of decreasing ability to earn a sustainable livelihood.33
Thus, life’s potentiality is exposed to a series of risks and dangers that
may ultimately result in an early and otherwise preventable death. This dis-
course on the vital conditions of slum dwellers is intertwined with a wider
developmental discourse concerned with the initiatives that must be taken to
improve the vitality of slum dwellers within the context of a worldwide mar-
ket, the growing importance of cities, and the recognition that NGOs and
CBOs play a central role in development.
Slums, Development, and the Competitive City
The truth discourse about the vital conditions of life in slums is intertwined
with a broader neoliberal development discourse that has the global poor as
its target population. While this development agenda includes a range of
policies, from greater trade liberalization to the removal of capital controls
and fiscal discipline, they are largely aimed at creating favorable and sus-
tainable investment climates that will induce the private sector to produce
employment opportunities for the poor and spur growth.34 Here, the focus
is not simply on the need to provide transnational corporations with strong
investment incentives in a predictable policy environment. The World Bank
reasons that favorable investment climates benefit everyone and are partic-
ularly good for the poor since entrepreneurial slum dwellers will not un-
leash their productive energies in a policy environment hostile to their busi-
ness interests. Although Habitat is somewhat skeptical about viewing growth
as a panacea for the problem of urban slums, the UN program does share the
World Bank’s concern to promote favorable investment climates and private
sector–led development.35
The creation of favorable investment climates, however, must be under-
stood within the context of the changing roles of cities in the global econ-
omy. One of the trends in the last decade has been the process of decentral-
ization whereby centralized governments devolve more decisionmaking
authority and responsibility to subnational governments.36 As a result, the
ability to attract foreign and domestic capital is viewed as an increasingly
important role of city governments. Neoliberals welcome this devolution of
power, since it leads to greater competition among governments and forces
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them to respond to the demands of citizens under their administration. This is
so because citizens as well as firms are reasoned to have a kind of structural
power over city governments since they have the ability to move from those
political jurisdictions that provide weak investment climates or standards of
living to ones that offer more attractive incentives and living environments—
for example, low crime rates, low property taxes, and decent schools. Thus,
ensuring capital’s confidence in the consistency and credibility of govern-
mental policies is no longer simply a national imperative of centralized gov-
ernments but also the concern of cities and their local administrations.
However, the expanded role of cities in the development process is not
the only change that has taken place under neoliberalism. NGOs and CBOs
are increasingly viewed as important agents in providing for the vital needs
and social welfare of the global poor. For instance, these civil society
organizations are recognized as contributing to achieving the Millennium
Development Goals in five ways: (1) raising awareness and promoting
development initiatives through their advocacy roles, (2) designing strate-
gies that will assist in meeting internationally agreed targets of poverty
alleviation, (3) partnering with government to implement strategies, (4)
assessing and monitoring the success of projects, and (5) delivering serv-
ices to poor communities and sharing technical knowledge.37 Currently,
Habitat estimates that there are 2,772 NGOs involved in human settlement
issues, with 39 percent of these “belonging to wider regional and interna-
tional NGO networks.”38
However, if the biopolitical project to improve the life of slum dwellers
fails, there is growing recognition that these spaces of insecurity may gen-
erate new forms of violent resistance that will threaten the stability of the
global economy and those who are privileged by current patterns of unequal
trade, finance, and production. In this light, a fourth biopolitical discourse
can be detected—one that is informed by military-strategic thought.
Securing the Borderland, Protecting Privileged Life
If the current effort to improve the life of slum dwellers can be considered
a form of “poor relief,” then the Pentagon’s planning for future urban war-
fare may be viewed as a form of “riot control” with the biopolitical aim of
protecting the winners of neoliberal globalization.39 As Davis has noted,
military planners in the Pentagon have been far less sanguine about the
prospects of creating sustainable urban environments without the blight of
slums.40 Instead, the Pentagon anticipates that cities will be the new battle-
spaces of the twenty-first century given the rapid rate of global urbaniza-
tion and the growing gap between the haves and have-nots.41 Toward this
end, the Pentagon developed the Handbook for Joint Urban Operations in
2000 and has coordinated mock urban warfare exercises in US cities; it has
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also developed video simulations, such as Urban Resolve 2015, which are
intended to train soldiers in operating in urban environments. Thus, the Pent-
agon is preparing for the day when the biopolitical project to improve the
lives of slum occupants fails. When it does, this growing class of dispos-
sessed humanity with little stake in the global economy will have to be con-
tained through a variety of lethal and nonlethal technologies. While the US-
led multinational force is currently involved in this endeavor in Iraq, the
main strategic interventions have been directed toward increasing welfare
rather than warfare.
Strategic Interventions
Since slums are considered spaces of deprivation where life’s possibilities
are in constant jeopardy, the overarching goal of biopolitical interventions is
to transform slum settlements into vital neighborhoods. This project is some-
what of a radical departure from past policy approaches to slum settlements.
Where settled or burgeoning slum populations were not ignored by govern-
ment policy, the main policy approaches used by national and local govern-
ments tended to be summary eviction, slum clearance, and forced resettle-
ment. Although such repressive practices continue today “in various forms
and contexts,” current strategic interventions tend to take place along biopo-
litical lines.42 What this means in practice is that clearances, evictions, and
forced resettlements are increasingly viewed as policy approaches that only
displace or exacerbate the problem of urban poverty and slum formation.
Such policies also tend to destroy the social networks that have evolved in
slum settlements—networks the poor consider vital for their survival. By
contrast, biopolitical interventions seek to enhance and invest in slum life by
identifying practices that will lead to the amelioration of living conditions.
Animated by the goal to improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers
by 2020 and arrest slum formation, UN Habitat has suggested that biopo-
litical strategic interventions follow a two-pronged strategy. The first is
concerned with revitalizing or upgrading existing slums by promoting
secure tenure. Initiatives here may include installing public toilets, improv-
ing streets, or providing microfinance for building materials and income
generation. However, as the task force on slum improvement has noted, this
response is only a “remedial measure made necessary by the inaction of
past governments and the failure to adopt or implement adequate and effi-
cient national and urban policies.”43
Rather than redressing previous policy failures, the second strategy is
aimed at preventing future slum formation through proactive policies that
take urban population growth seriously. Here, suggested interventions are
more comprehensive and overlap with the goal of transforming cities into
competitive and attractive investment climates for local and transnational
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firms. These interventions range from building public infrastructure such as
walkways, parks, roads, and sewer systems, to subsidizing the construction
of low-income housing and providing property titles and record keeping.
Both UN Habitat and the World Bank recognize the important role the state
can play in facilitating these interventions—particularly when there is evi-
dence of market failure. However, since the policy options and resources of
governments are severely constrained within the context of disciplinary
neoliberalism and a debt crisis without any foreseeable end, NGOs and
CBOs tend to become a kind of biopolitical panacea by default. This is com-
pounded by the fact that large sectors of the slum population work infor-
mally and may be outside the tax grid—further starving the state of
resources. This may help explain why the predominant response to the prob-
lem of global slums—what UN Habitat calls “current best practice”—is par-
ticipatory slum improvement rather than coordinated and long-term urban
planning and investment by the state.44 Here NGOs work with local govern-
ments and slum communities to upgrade their neighborhoods. For instance,
one of the most quoted success stories is the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi,
which “empowered” slum dwellers to build sewer systems by contributing
their own scarce resources. This best practice is grounded in an ethic of self-
help and is connected to what Foucault called “technologies of the self.”
Technologies of the Self
A third dimension of the biopolitical governance of global slums is the
development of various technologies of the self. Technologies of the self
consist of a series of self-conscious self-practices that are intertwined with
power relations and dominant understandings of what it means to be a
good, normal, or worthy subject. The aim of these technologies is to pro-
duce the “self” and certain modes of being through successive modifica-
tions of individual conduct and thought. However, while these practices are
productive of individual subjectivity, they also constrain certain patterns of
thought and action.45
The technologies of the self cultivated in global slums must be under-
stood within the broader context of neoliberal governmentality, its scepti-
cism of state-led development projects, and its ontological privileging of
the entrepreneurial subject. Since neoliberals are against central planning,
the modes of subjectification that tend to be encouraged are largely in-
formed by an ethic of self-help that considers slum dwellers “active agents
and not passive beneficiaries of development.”46 Here, the inhabitants of
the world’s global slums are considered active agents in providing solutions
to their problems and are made responsible for their own livelihood and
health.
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The technologies of the self found in global slums aim to cultivate the
capacities of the poor and range from educating the self about sanitation
and hygiene to undertaking skills training and learning to be responsible
debtors, savers, and entrepreneurs. For instance, one of the most wide-
spread modes of subjectification in informal settlements is entrepreneurial.
Associated with the microcredit revolution, this approach encourages poor
women and men to give their lives an entrepreneurial form as a way of gen-
erating income and securing the livelihood of their household. Although
microcredit, over its thirty-five-year history as an antipoverty strategy, has
been heralded as a panacea for people living in deep poverty—and one of
its key spokespersons, founder of the Grameen Bank Muhammad Yunus,
won the Noble Peace Prize—there has been little evidence of microlend-
ing’s success. What is certain is that microlending schemes help privatize
and individualize peoples’ responsibility for earning a livelihood, thus less-
ening their dependence on the state or subnational governments. In this
way, encouraging the poor to participate in their own survival strategies by
accumulating personal debt and creating small businesses displaces any
sense that poverty and unemployment may be structural or that the state has
any responsibility for collective welfare.47 As one observer has commented,
The popularity of microcredit programmes among donor agencies can be
understood within this context where the state is no longer responsible for
creating employment, and the poor are expected to strengthen their own
capacities toward livelihood security. Livelihood security becomes a mat-
ter of optimal utilization of the abilities and resources that one possesses.
In the absence of critical education and awareness building, alternatives to
the dominant economic regime are less likely to emerge, as are new under-
standings of collective good.48
Thus, in one sense, the microcredit revolution has facilitated the dis-
course of self-help/empowerment and its attendant practices while displac-
ing any notion of entitlement and collective well-being. It is perhaps small
wonder then that major banks and credit agencies such as Citigroup, Mas-
terCard, and JPMorgan are enthusiasts of creating an entrepreneurial civil
society, not least because a few loyal microcredit customers may eventually
transform their fruit stands into global grocery empires in need of finance
and business consultation.
Thus, the governance of global slums is now a multilevel biopolitical
imperative with a clearly defined—if flawed—population target. Coalesced
around the Millennium Project’s target to improve the lives of 100 million
slum dwellers by 2020 and arrest the future production of informal settle-
ments, actors involved in the governance of slums range from supranational
institutions to individuals who give their own lives meaning by adopting an
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entrepreneurial mode of being as a way out of poverty. However, while many
actors are involved in the great biopolitical chain of governing global slums,
their strategic interventions to improve life are likely to fail in an age where
neoliberal dictates continue to dominate the policy agenda of governments
and their supranational institutions. NGOs and CBOs seem to play a unique
and privileged role insofar as neoliberal policies have helped create the space
for their ongoing interventions and development. Indeed, for many, these
organizations are to be celebrated—if only by default for some—as a kind of
panacea for the problem of global slums in an age where the state has largely
been discredited as an agent of development. The following sections offer a
critique of this point of view by referring to the critical literature on non-
governmental and community-based organizations and the political economy
of disciplinary neoliberalism.
Band-Aids and Islands of Success
Much of the literature on NGOs and CBOs has noticed that their growth
and proliferation coincides with the near-ubiquitous adoption of neoliberal
policies. As such, any critique of biopolitical projects led by these organi-
zations should take care to recognize not only the historical context of their
emergence, but also the particularities of neoliberal capitalism. As a ration-
ality of rule, neoliberalism is highly suspicious of state-led development
projects, for two main reasons. First, neoliberals assume that it is impossi-
ble for central administrations to develop a knowledge of all the individual
desires or needs of citizens. As a consequence, any effort at central plan-
ning is doomed to fail, since large-scale projects are likely to exclude some
and include others while crowding out private initiatives. For neoliberals,
the solution to this problem is to rely on the private sector and price signals
in the market. Here, the price mechanism is taken as the best indicator of an
individual’s needs and wants since (at least in a freely competitive market
economy) it is assumed to register the demand and supply of goods and
services accurately. In this way, neoliberals argue that a decentralized and
competitive pricing mechanism, rather than a centralized authority, acts as
the most efficient and effective coordinating mechanism for organizing the
needs and wants of interdependent societies.
However, while this epistemological position undergirds the rationality
of neoliberalism, it was largely ignored in the era of “embedded liberalism”
when state-directed development was deemed essential to stave off revolu-
tionary activity and provide for general social welfare and the common
good.49 For most of the world, the debt crisis served to change this orien-
tation and led state actors—however reluctantly in some cases—to adopt a
series of structural adjustment programs to ensure the repayment of domes-
tic and foreign-owned debt. The fiscal austerity required by international
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creditors served to radically transform public administrations around the world
by demanding the sale of public enterprises, calling for layoffs, and insisting
on cuts in social and welfare spending. One consequence of this austerity was
to starve the state of resources that could be used in public investment proj-
ects. With the rapid deterioration of life’s conditions in this new policy envi-
ronment, a space opened up for new actors to become involved in social and
community welfare provision. Moreover, since the state was increasingly
viewed as “corrupt, inefficient, dictatorial, parasitic and inflexible,” neoliber-
als and many leftists celebrated these proliferating civil society actors as cen-
tral to the biopolitical project of development and democratization.50
Outside the congratulatory literature on these civil society organiza-
tions, however, there are significant reasons for remaining skeptical about
the biopolitical campaign of NGOs and CBOs and what they can achieve in
global slums. Here I follow Robert Cox in noting that civil society should be
considered a social category inclusive of both hegemonic and counterhege-
monic social forces, and not a homogenous zone of actors with an instinc-
tive desire to promote democracy and development.51 Thus, while I offer
reasons later for remaining skeptical about relying on these organizations to
achieve the biopolitical project of improving the lives of slum dwellers, I do
not deny that many of these social forces have progressive agendas that may
seek to challenge the hegemonic power structures that currently lead to the
generation and reproduction of slums. For example, Arjun Appadurai, in his
study of an alliance of three civic organizations concerned with housing
issues in Mumbai, offered a positive assessment of their agency and poten-
tial to improve their living conditions. The civic organizations, collectively
known as the Alliance, largely shunned top-down expertise and tutelage and
instead focused on building their movement based on their own hopes,
dreams, and needs. For Appadurai, the participatory and democratic organi-
zational structure of this movement, along with their strategies and knowl-
edge for improving their lives and dealing with local authorities represented
a “sort of governmentality from below.”52 However, while Appadurai rightly
celebrates some of the successes this type of participatory organization can
achieve, his analysis does little to focus our attention on what might be
called “the limits of the possible” of this type of agency. Highlighting these
limitations does not deny that the urban poor can improve their own living
conditions. Nor is it to deny that they develop their own forms of knowledge
by which to struggle against political authority. A focus on the critical liter-
ature on NGOs and CBOs does, however, suggest a more nuanced view of
what can be expected of these types of agency, particularly given the mag-
nitude of the problem.
There are at least six reasons identified in the critical literature that
suggest a more nuanced view of what NGOs and CBOs can accomplish in
the world’s slums.
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1. Privatization of the public interest. Relying on NGOs and CBOs as
agents of social welfare effectively privatizes the responsibility for social
problems and tends to occlude any notion that the state has a responsibility
to provide for the welfare of its citizens. It also deligitimizes any notion of
the public good as specific constituencies come to identify with their own
in-group and compete for scarce resources.53
2. Problems of accountability. Though they intervene in particular con-
stituencies and are often unproblematically assumed to represent the inter-
ests of their constituents, NGOs are typically beholden to their donors first
and foremost. What this means in practice is that projects to improve the
lives of slum dwellers may be far less accountable and representative of
local residents than one might otherwise assume.54 Relying on donor
finance also increases the chances of co-optation, not simply because
money can be withheld from those organizations that deviate from accepted
best practices, but also because finance can be directed toward those insti-
tutions that fit with hegemonic understandings of development.
3. Problems of representation. NGOs and CBOs are typically viewed as
agents of democracy working alongside their constituents to improve the
welfare of their communities. However, although NGOs and CBOs may
indeed contribute to greater forms of civic participation and political em-
powerment, many of these organizations may be organized hierarchically,
have unelected staff, and dictate policy options rather than engage in good
faith negotiations with their constituencies about their needs and the ways in
which they can be fulfilled. In this sense, a participatory process may be one
“in which participants cannot ask questions, and are told what to do.”55
4. Short-term, small-scale, constituency-specific projects. Another rea-
son to be skeptical about what NGOs and CBOs can achieve in global slums
consists in the scope and temporal framework of their interventions. The fact
that many of their projects are targeted at specific constituencies for short
time periods on relatively small scales has led critical scholars to argue that
these organizations can only provide “band aid social welfare,” thus ignor-
ing holistic approaches to slum improvement and structural reasons for their
global proliferation and reproduction.56 Indeed, in a review of the past thirty
years of slum interventions, UN Habitat remarked that “many programmes
were unsuccessful; others, while successful at the pilot stages, could not be
scaled up and remained small ‘islands of success’ that did not have a signif-
icant impact on urban poverty levels or slum growth rates.”57
5. Focus on technical solutions. NGOs and CBOs tend to emphasize
technical solutions to the many problems of insecurity and deprivation
experienced by slum dwellers. However, a focus on technical solutions,
such as the provision of public toilets, tends to distract attention away from
the larger sociopolitical forces that contribute to the generation of informal
settlements in the first place.58
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6. Deradicalization. Another critique of NGOs and CBOs is that they
tend to deradicalize actual and potential social movements by directing and
channeling their energies in certain ways and not others. Within the context
of neoliberalism, the managerial and administrative roles these organiza-
tions play tend to be directed toward training “the poor to compete in the
marketplace.”59 As such, the potential for collective political action and radi-
cal social change is minimized.
There are therefore significant reasons for remaining skeptical about
what NGOs and CBOs can achieve in global slums—particularly since their
growth, proliferation, and involvement in the development process coincides
with a set of policy prescriptions that prioritizes the private sector and the
market over public forms of investment that may be longer-term and capable
of reaching a larger segment of the population in need of sustainable and
affordable housing. Indeed, in this policy environment, even the paltry bio-
political campaign to improve the lives of slum dwellers under the Millen-
nium Declaration appears increasingly doomed to failure. Initial evidence
for this claim can be found in the UN’s own attempts to assess progress in
achieving the goals of the Millennium Declaration. If current approaches to
slum improvement continue, even the attempt to improve the lives of 100
slum dwellers—about one-tenth of the global slum population—will not be
met by 2020.60
The Stark Utopia of Global Slums
Without using Marx’s colorful language to describe the historical process
by which rural producers are dislocated from any nonmarket access to the
means of survival and hurled onto urban labor markets that cannot absorb
them, UN Habitat’s 2003 report is a scathing, if nuanced, indictment of neo-
liberalism and the growth of urban poverty. In examining some of the root
causes of slum formation, the authors of the report begin by noting the
growing inequality that has coincided with the near-ubiquitous adoption of
neoliberal policies:
The neo-liberal agenda of state withdrawal, free markets and privatization
achieved pre-eminence in English-speaking countries, and soon was
exported to the world at large. This agenda was to have a very negative
impact on income distribution and also, in a number of countries, an
equally negative impact on economic growth and poverty. From 1973 to
1993, inequality, however measured, increased between countries, within
most countries and in the world as a whole.61
The report also stresses that inequality has deepened both within and be-
tween cities of the world. The report links such uneven patterns of development
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and the growth of inequality with a series of structural adjustment programs
(SAPs—rebranded as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) that were imple-
mented by nations experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties. While not all
SAPs are identical, their overall—one might say only—purpose is to reengineer
state-civil society complexes to ensure the consistent payment of interest on the
“national” debt. As such, and regardless of whether SAPs are endorsed by the
IMF or self-adopted by governments that want to appear credible in the eyes of
their bondholders, they tend to constrain the fiscal flexibility of governments by
calling for budget austerity. What this generally entails is a process by which
the budgets of government departments are slashed, public servants are laid off,
and subsidies or price controls for basic goods are removed. The privatization,
or sale of public assets to private investors, has also been a key feature of dis-
ciplinary neoliberalism. While neoliberals believe that private firms are run
more effectively and efficiently than publicly operated ones, a more convincing
explanation for the massive global wave of privatizations throughout the 1980s
and 1990s was not efficiency, but the need of governments to generate suffi-
cient income to finance their mounting debt burdens. Such policies may con-
tribute to and even exacerbate the problem of poverty and the formation of
slums by (1) redirecting state resources away from public investment initiatives
and toward creditors, (2) generating a crisis of unemployment and underem-
ployment as the public sector is downsized and wages are slashed, and (3) mak-
ing basic goods and services more expensive on local markets.
Structural adjustment programs have also promoted greater trade liber-
alization for developing countries even though all advanced capitalist coun-
tries industrialized and developed “under heavy regimes of protection (and
still do in many cases).”62 Trade liberalization can affect slum formation in
a number of ways. However, the most common is by forcing local producers
to compete with more cheaply produced foreign goods of the same or better
quality. For example, while Haiti has long been self-sufficient in the pro-
duction of rice, with the imposition of a structural adjustment program by
the US government and IMF in 1994, the Haitian government agreed to
lower its strong tariff protections for Haitian rice producers. Within a year,
US producers of rice flooded the Haitian market with cheaper products,
thereby undercutting Haitian producers. Over time, more and more of Haiti’s
rural rice farmers were run out of business and forced to flee the countryside
into the slums of Port-au-Prince or risk their lives on ocean rafts.63 This
process of market eviction is not endemic to Haiti; it is experienced all over
the world by rural producers who must compete with large subsidized
agribusinesses based in the United States and Europe.
The trend in rural-to-urban migration is further exacerbated by foreign
aid policies that have sought to increase agricultural productivity, largely
through mechanized farming. Since mechanized farming requires less human
labor, opportunities for income generation in rural spaces tends to decline
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over time, leaving many small farmers to become rural refugees in cities
that have neither the infrastructural supports for the healthy maintenance
and reproduction of life nor employment opportunities that would help the
poor earn an income needed to purchase adequate shelter.
The built environments of global slums are a testament to the ongoing
dispossession of people around the world and to a more commodified, lib-
eralized, and marketized world order facilitated by neoliberal policies. Thus,
any discussion of biopolitical campaigns must take care to recognize how
these interventions to improve life are informed and ultimately constrained
by neoliberal policies and the forms of capital accumulation they are meant
to encourage and secure. In some senses, this twenty-first-century indict-
ment of neoliberalism is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi’s condemnation of an
earlier period of economic liberalism. Polanyi argued that a rationality of
rule centered on the belief in free markets, and the price mechanism implied
a “stark utopia” where the natural and human substance of society would
inevitably be annihilated if society did not take measures to protect itself.64
For Polanyi, this stark utopia was averted only after World War II, when
governments abandoned economic liberalism in favor of social planning and
collective welfare schemes. The growth and proliferation of global slums
could be taken as both the spatial instantiation of this stark utopia and the
apartheid of life chances that has accompanied neoliberalism. The scale of
this problem is tremendous and represents one of the key governance chal-
lenges of the twenty-first century—one that seems increasingly unable to be
met without a radical turn away from neoliberal policies and an overreliance
on nongovernmental and community-based organizations. c
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